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Abstract. With the current paper wewill intend i) to elaborate a criti-
cal examination of the alleged use of transparency as independent of
any epistemological view in favor of evidentialism, ii) to remark the
inadequacies of the Absjørn Steglich-Petersen’s attempt to replace
the concept of belief with that of truth in reflective contexts in re-
sponse to the claim of some evidentialist who want to use transpa-
rency to support their own dialectical purposes, and iii) to suggest a
new approach to transparency which allows us to expand the theo-
retical horizons in which philosophical research on the subject has
so far moved.
Keywords. Belief, Transparency, Evidentialism, Doxastic Delibera-
tion.
Copyright. CC© BY:© $\© C© 2018 Rodrigo Neira. Published in Italy. Some rights reserved.
Author. Rodrigo Neira, rneira1984@hotmail.com.
Received. 24 March 2018. Accepted. 2 July 2018.
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
9:1
(2018)
99
Rodrigo Neira Evidentialism and Transparency: a Critical Approach
Introduction
Concerning the examination of one’s own doxastic behavior, a preliminary cha-
racterisation of the phenomenon of transparency may be as follows: when a re-
flexive subject raises the question of whether to believe that p –when he is going
to examine his epistemic state with respect to p –, the considerations he selects
are the same as if he has to answer the question of whether p is the case. The
phenomenon of transparency consists in transferring the question about one’s
own inner doxastic constitution to the objective consideration of the truth value
of p. In this sense, it may be said that the doxastic behavior are transparent to
factual aspects of the world.
1 Transparency and conceptual evidentialism
Evidentialism can be understood as the view that the doxastic behavior of a ra-
tional subject – or at least the conscious doxastic behavior of a rational subject
– is governed by the principle of believing that p only if p. Bernard Williams
(1973, p. 136) suggests that a reference to truth is one of the basic features of
beliefs without apparently trying to defend evidentialism: "Beliefs aim at truth".
Miriam McCormick (2015, p. 15) notes that Williams establishes that the aim
at truth which characterizes a person’s doxastic behavior is the expression of a
conceptual truth about belief. The evidentialist principle can only be accepted
once the subject has the concept of belief. Understandingwhat itmeans to have
a belief involves admitting that it aims at truth.
This form of evidentialism is called "conceptual". Themain characteristic of
conceptual evidentialism as opposed to “doxastic freedom” evidentialism is that
it considers that the norm of believing that p on the basis of sufficient evidence
in favor of the truth of p is not a moral imperative. Conceptual evidentialism
has different versions which can be distinguished according to their intensity.
Jonathan Adler (2002), who presents themost extreme evidentialist conception,
argues that it is conceptually impossible to harbor a belief while knowing that
there is not enough evidence which supports it. Adler argues that certain as-
sertions inspired by Moore’s paradox are unsustainable. Consider the case of
the following conjunction inspired in Moore’s paradox: "The number of stars is
even, but I do not have enough evidence that the number of stars in even". Since
both are statementswhich canbe true at the same time, the contradictionwhich
prevents the subject fromaccepting the conjunction shouldmanifest itself in his
thought. By asserting that the number of stars is even, we express our belief that
the number of stars is even, but if we do not have sufficient evidence in favor of
the truth of the proposition that the number of stars is even, we are not entitled
to consider it true while judging whether to adopt it as the object of any of our
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beliefs.
Adler’s evidentialism has been widely contested. McCormick (2015, pp. 19-
21) has described cases of gaps or inconsistencies between a subject’s best epis-
temic judgments and the beliefs he adopts. Jens Dam Ziska (2016, pp. 41-44)
Ziska has denied that a conjunction of the form "p, but I do not have sufficient
evidence that p is true" entails by itself any contradiction in the subject’s thought
without the additional premise that when we realize that the evidence we pos-
sess is not enough to assure that p is true, we cease to believe that p is true.
This premise seems weak if we consider the examples of people who have
certain doxastic behavior while knowing that the evidence they count with is
not enough to assure that their beliefs are true. Adler could answer thatmany of
these cases are "esoteric [...] like those which can occur in the thought of amen-
tally disturbed person" (Adler, 2002, p. 35), so that these objections reinforce his
theory. But even if thatwere true, a philosophical doctrinemustmeasure its suc-
cess according to its ability to respond to the most peripheral and challenging
cases.
A softer version of conceptual evidentialism is put forward by Nishi Shah. In
an article written in collaboration with David Velleman (see Shah and Velleman
2005), Shah argues that transparency occurs only when a belief is adopted in a
deliberative context, that is to say, in a context in which the subjectmakes use of
the concept of belief. According to Shah, transparency implies that in delibera-
tive circumstances the subject only takes into account those reasons which can
be seen as relevant to determine the truth or falsehood of the proposition under
consideration. The concept of belief imposes a condition which must be ac-
cepted by the subject if he wants to conceive his personal deliberation as aimed
at adopting a belief. This condition is that deliberating about whether to believe
p implies accepting that the belief that p is only correct if p is true: “When one
deliberates about whether to have an attitude conceived as the belief that p is
true, one deliberates about an attitude to which the standard of being correct
only if p is true already applies" (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 501). This explana-
tion of transparency as exclusively linked to those contexts in which the subject
makes use of the concept of belief is compatible with the existence of elements
perceived as irrelevant with respect to the truth or falsehood of the proposition
under consideration, which can influence on whether it is adopted as doxastic
content. When the subject does not make use of the concept of belief, there is
not any conceptual imperative which implies a selection based on the truth or
falsity of the proposition.
Shah and Velleman’s argument is based on transparency understood as an
epistemologically neutral phenomenon. In another articlewhichwas published
a little earlier (Shah 2003, p. 466), Shah refers to the need for an epistemologi-
cal framework capable of integrating the fact that the subject who reflectively
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adopts a belief only takes into account the considerations he sees as relevant to
determinewhether the proposition in question is true or false. The solution sug-
gests the existence of different contexts of belief formation in relation towhether
or not the subject makes use of the concept of belief. As long as the subject con-
ceives his deliberation as directed to the adoptionof a belief, hemust accept that
the resulting propositional attitude would be correct only if it is true, so that he
is obliged to base either his belief or his non-belief on the rational considera-
tions he is able to gather about the truth or falsehood of the proposition he is
reflecting about. These are the main lines of Shah and Velleman’s strategy: this
particular version of conceptual evidentialism provides a plausible explanation
for transparency.
2 Objections against Shah and Velleman’s approach
Shah and Velleman represent the use of transparency as case for evidentialism.
We will now raise some objections against their approach and examine an at-
tempt to correct some of its fundamental points. Shah and Velleman seem to
suppose a conception of doxastic correction which can be described as exter-
nalist, since it seems to follow from it that the subject does not have access to
the truth or falsehood of his beliefs, but only to the sum of what he perceives as
evidence in favor of one or the other. The subject cannot be fully certain that his
belief is true. However, the standard of correction for belief affects the doxastic
behavior of the subject and allows it to be framed in a scheme of assessment.
That is to say, if the belief that p is correct when it is true and incorrect when
it is false, then there is an imperative which affects the behavior of the subject
who has been asked the question whether he believes p and is trying to answer
it. The subject must base his attitude with respect to whether p is the case on
the considerations that he sees as relevant to determine the truth value of p. The
problemwith Shah and Velleman’s approach here is that it seems to assume that
the subject can stop basing his doxastic attitudes on evidence about what is the
case. The fact that any given behavior is correct in any sense does not make it
mandatory, but seems to involve the possibility of violating the norm.
If there is the possibility of acting both correctly and incorrectly in the reflex-
ive formation of a belief, the subject who reflects on that matter should be able
tomake the decision of not taking into account the evidence at his disposal. The
subject should be able to evade the alleged gravitational force of evidence at the
cost of wrongdoing. This seems incompatible with understanding transparency
in Shah’s manner as conceptually inseparable from the reflective formation of
beliefs: it would be the subject who identifies the question of whether to be-
lieve that p with the question of whether p, so that transparency could not be
epistemologically neutral. Transparency should be the requirement for compli-
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ance with an epistemic obligation analogous to the ordinary moral duty. The
introduction a norm of correction specifically linked to belief seems to imply
an ethical consideration: the subject must be free not to act in accordance with
the norm. In the reflective formation of a belief, the subject may disregard the
evidence and accept a proposition on the basis of some kind of spiritual peace.
Until now we have tried to illustrate the apparent inconsistencies which can
be found in Shah and Velleman’s approach. If one speaks of correct doxastic be-
havior, it seems that one must admit that the subject can evade transparency
even in reflective contexts only by refraining from following the relevant norm.
Transparency would no longer have a factual character, which is precisely the
startingpoint of Shah’s argument, butwouldbepresented as the consequenceof
a previous choice of the subject. This wouldmake it possible to introducemulti-
ple criteria on the basis of which to judge beliefs (see Zalabardo 2010). Cannot a
belief be correct or incorrect in different ways? Cannot the subject who does not
take into account the evidence be wrong according to one criterion, but right
from the point of view of other criterion? A belief would not be right or wrong in
an absolute sense.
Other objections which can be raised against Shah’s approach relate to the
nature of the considerations involved in the reflective formation of beliefs. Shah
seems to characterize the reflective adoption of beliefs as a deductive argument
whose premises are constituted by considerations that the subject understands
as relevant to determine the truth value of the proposition in question, that is
to say, its conclusion. This is the basic criteria. Starting from this way of under-
standing the logical structure of the reflexive adoption of beliefs, it is possible
to explore two strategies against Shah’s approach: the first takes into account
that the conclusion of personal deliberation about what to believe as Shah un-
derstands it is nothing more than a factual proposition: when the subject raises
the question of whether to believe that p, his logical activities lead, according
to Shah’s model, to the utterance that something is the case. However, it is not
clear that a factual statement arrived at as the conclusion of an argument will be
enough tomake it an object of belief. If its logical structure is that of a deductive
argument which seeks to determine whether the proposition being examined is
true or false, the deliberation on what to believe will end just with a fact, that is,
the conclusion of the argument is not a belief, but the statement that something
is the case. In any case, an additional premise would be needed to link what
is known as true with the corresponding belief. But the problem with taking
that step is that it seems to introduce a certain discordance which goes against
Shah’s requirement of immediacy. It would seem that in this way the subject of
personal deliberation about what to believe does not do anything more than a
logical calculation based on premiseswithwhich hemaintains a purely intellec-
tual relationship. With that additional premise it seems that Shahwould incur in
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circularity: considerations unrelated to the truth or falsity of the proposition do
not intervene in the reflective formation of beliefs, since there is a premise in the
personal deliberation about what to believe which prevents it. But it is the rele-
vance of introducing such a premise that is under discussion. The evidentialist
characterization is based on the deliberation about what to believe as part of
the concept of belief, and at the same time the concept of belief characterized in
the evidentialist way is used to explain a truth about the reflective formation of
beliefs. It would be said that there is something problematic in approaching the
logic of the reflective formation of beliefs from the understanding of the concept
of belief that is obtained from the analysis of deliberation about what to believe.
The second argumentative strategy that we will explore against Shah’s ap-
proach has to do with the kind of reasons on the basis of which the subject
adopts a belief. Is it not possible to find examples of beliefs which are con-
scious and contradict the evidence? It seems that a person may sincerely de-
clare a belief while knowing that the evidence does not support the proposition.
The believer can do without the evidence. However, this does not occur under
whichever condition, but when the belief fulfils certain characteristics. Let us
think of the case of a religious person who believes in the metempsychosis of
souls or the transubstantiation. The religious believer perseveres in his doxas-
tic behavior without seeming to care that the evidence does not support it. Is it
enough to accuse the religiousbeliever of epistemological negligence? The same
should be said of much of humankind. Would not our position be arrogant? In
relation to Shah’s approach, religion offers examples of conscious doxastic be-
havior which cannot be adopted at the end of a process of personal deliberation
aboutwhat to believewhich concludeswith the affirmation of a factual proposi-
tion as true. Why does the religious believer maintain, even in reflective condi-
tions, doxastic behavior whose content he cannot consider true? Here, there is
something similar to an asymmetry betweenpurely factual and critical-religious
contexts. Shah’s conception may be valid when it is about proposition corre-
sponding to truth conditions which can be specified. But the reasons which the
religious believer may invoke in favour of his doxastic conduct will not be such
that they can be seen as relevant to determine whether processes such as the
metempsychosis or the transubstantiation are taking place, that is, they cannot
function as premises in the personal deliberation about what to believe in or-
der to determine whether the proposition is true or false. The evidence does
not seem to be taken into account in the reflective examination of one’s doxastic
behavior when the content of the belief is within the bounds of religion.
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3 Steglich-Petersen and his attempt to set out a new
model of transparency
We have raised until now three objections against Shah’s evidentialism: we have
seen that the imposition of a standard of correction over conscious doxastic be-
havior seems to imply the possibility of believing something against the eviden-
tialist requirement; we have examined the problems which arise from personal
deliberation understood as a deductive argument; and we have considered the
difficulties of Shah’s approach to the doxastic behavior of certain agents who
adopt beliefs in reflective contexts while knowing that they cannot invoke rea-
sons to determine the truth or falsity of the given content. But if we accept these
objections, we will not only have to abandon Shah’s approach. What is the state
of transparency once objections have been raised to the point of rejecting any
preference for thisway of understanding the reflective examination of one’s dox-
astic behavior? In so far as it is understood in themanner of Shah, transparency
does not seem to occur in the reflective formation of beliefs aimed at the ques-
tion of whether to adopt a religious content as object of doxastic endorsement.
But according to the other objections, it would also be said that it does not fulfil
some of the characteristics which Shah attributes to it while exposing the phe-
nomenon. If the subject may not fulfil evidentialist requirements and it is pos-
sible to speak of doxastic inadequacy as a possibility against doxastic adequacy,
shouldwe not consider that transparency is not a genuine phenomenon, that is,
that it occurs as a consequence of a choice of the subject? And if the consider-
ations not relevant to determine the truth or falsity of the given proposition are
excluded from the deliberation about what to believe understood according to
the logical form of a deductive argument whose conclusion is the affirmation of
a fact, is it not also because the subject has preferred an evidentialist standard
rather than other?
Absjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013) has tried to offer a formulation of transpa-
rency designed to avoid having to consider it as a feature of the subject’s delib-
eration about what to believe by making use of the concept of belief. Steglich-
Petersen’s strategy is based on an interpretation ofwhatwe oftenmeanwhenwe
think of the question of whether to believe that p. Starting from the description
of a phenomenon analogous to transparency, transparency*, Steglich-Petersen
seeks a common explanation for both. Transparency* consists in the fact that,
whenwe consider the question ofwhether p is the case, we base our response on
those considerations which we take as relevant to determine the truth or falsity
of p. In contrast to transparency, transparency* invokes a type of deliberation
in which the concept of belief does not appear. Apart from that, transparency
and transparency* are identical phenomena, including the possibility that both
the question of whether to believe that p and the question of whether p have an
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unconscious or thoughtless answer without need for the subject to engage in a
deliberative process.
Steglich-Petersen argues that, given similarities between transparency and
transparency*, they should be cases of the same general principle. This implies
that transparency is not to be explained by using the concept of belief, i.e. as a
feature of deliberation in which the subject makes use of the concept of belief,
but in a different and more general way which also explains transparency*. In
Steglich-Petersen’s view, this commonexplanation comes fromconsidering that
both transparency and transparency* are instances of a principle which states
that it is not possible to do something for a certain purpose while being aware
thatwhat is being done is not conducive to the achievement of that purpose. Ac-
cording to this, deliberation about whether p is the case, in which transparency*
is given, is an activity aimed at correctly answering the question of whether p
is the case. Considerations which are not relevant to determining the truth or
falsity of p will also fail to answer correctly the question of whether p is the case.
Thus a person cannot attempt to answer the question of whether p on the ba-
sis of considerations which are known to be irrelevant to determine the truth or
falsity of p.
How could transparency be considered as an instance of the principle that
it is not possible to do something aiming at a particular purpose while knowing
that the purpose in question will not be achieved by that means? Transparency
is characterisedby the fact that it links twoapparently different questions: trans-
parency consists in that the question of whether to believe that p is treated from
the point of view of the subject in the same way as the question of whether p.
With respect to transparency*, however, there is only one question involved: the
subject asks whether p is the case and bases his answer on those considerations
which can be selected as relevant to determine whether p is the case. The solu-
tion proposed by Steglich-Petersen is to assume that the question of whether to
believe that p can be addressed in different contexts. Transparency only occurs
when what the subject means in posing the question whether to believe that p
is just whether p. Then the subject expresses with the verb "believe" a ques-
tion about a fact. The differences between transparency and transparency* are
merely linguistic. Transparency and transparency* are identical in fundamental
aspects, so that the explanation for both must be the same. Transparency must
be explained in the same way as transparency*: it must receive an explanation
in terms of the principle that it is not possible to do something for a particular
purpose while being aware that what is being done does not fulfil that purpose.
Both phenomena are instances of this more general principle.
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4 Steglich Petersen’s criticism of Shah’s approach
It seems that Steglich-Petersen’s conception is free of the apparent weaknesses
on the basis of which we have formulated some of our objections against Shah’s
approach. In turning personal deliberation about what to believe into personal
deliberation aboutwhat is the case, Steglich-Petersendoes not need the concept
of belief. That is to say, it is no longer possible to speak of a standard of correc-
tionwhich is given by the concept of belief and fromwhich the subject can devi-
ate by denying that transparency is conceptually inseparable from the reflective
formation of beliefs, so that the objection formulated above is deactivated here.
Likewise, Steglich-Petersen renounces the evidentialist model of doxastic legit-
imacy extracted from the concept of belief, so his approach eludes the logical
accusation of circularity. If deliberation about what to believe is dispensed with
when the concept of belief is used, the considerations as towhether p is the case
in the relevant deliberation cannot be a consequence of the application of the
concept of belief.
But Steglich-Petersen’s model does not seem so effective when integrating
the case of religious beliefs. We have seen that issues such as the metempsy-
chosis or the transubstantiation seemimmune to theevidence. Steglich-Petersen
seeks to solve the problem by distinguishing a special deliberative context in
which the question of whether to believe p is not identified with the question
of whether p is the case. Steglich-Petersen uses the example of the belief in life
beyond death. Aware of the dizzy transience of life and paralysed by the per-
spective of an absolute annihilation, a person may wonder whether, although
the evidence does not allow to reach any conclusion on the truth or falsity of the
matter, the belief in life beyond death should be adopted. A person in such a sit-
uation is not merely concerned with life beyond death, but rather with whether
the question about a belief should be approached on the basis of nothing more
than the truth value of a proposition. In cases like that, deliberation is genuinely
about whether to believe something and should not be identified with the de-
termination of the truth value of a proposition. Steglich-Petersen suggests that
transparency does not occur in deliberative contexts where the concept of be-
lief is important by itself rather than merely expressing the subject’s interest in
determining whether something is the case. As a result, religious beliefs are ex-
cluded from transparency.
Shouldwe resign ourselves to this conclusion? Transparencywould thenbe a
property of certain beliefs. Deliberation about whether to believe in life beyond
death is not a mere consideration of the truth or falsity of the proposition. The
problem is not that the question of whether or not there is life beyond death
cannot be asked, but that it would be asked as a consequence of the subject’s
willingness to approach the question from a certain point of view. The fact that
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Steglich-Petersen is forced to deny that transparency manifests itself in relation
to certain beliefs can be seen as a sign of the weakness of his approach. If the
Steglich-Petersen’s conception is taken for granted, transparency cannot be a
conceptual property of beliefs. The foreseeable recourse to deny that religious
beliefs are beliefs would contradict the non-problematic everyday practice of
considering them as beliefs.
We encounter a dilemma. We could take a view such as Steglich-Petersen’s
and admit that transparency has exceptions in certain beliefs whose truth or fal-
sity cannot be determined on the basis of the evidence, so that transparency
would not be a genuine phenomenon. The other option is to develop a new for-
mulation of the concept of transparency which is capable of explaining those
cases which are problematic. Success in this purpose would ensure that trans-
parency is a genuinephenomenon. Ifwe lookat the second termof thedilemma,
we can try to find out whether transparency can in any sense be attributed to re-
ligious beliefs. This means acting on the concept of transparency both by purg-
ing it of Shah’s evidentialist servitudes and by avoiding converting it to the trivial
consequence of the subject’s interest in facts, masked by the use of the verb of
propositional attitude.
Remember the featurewehave remark on religious beliefs. They are immune
to the evidence. But being immune to the evidence in the case of religious be-
liefs does not mean that they are immune to the truth of their content. The re-
ligious believer can behave independently of evidence without avoiding truth,
that is to say, without abandoning the aspiration that his belief is true. Accord-
ing to these considerations, we could perhaps develop the second term of the
dilemma. Could not transparency be defined as the phenomenon consisting of
that the subject would answer the same to the question whether to believe that
p than to the question whether p? That would involve not taking into account
which considerations are used as the basis for the answer. The approach we are
suggesting here probably implies not to imposing any qualification on the rea-
sons on the basis of which the subject adheres to a belief. Thus, for transparency
tobe attributed tobeliefs such as themetempsychosis or the transubstantiation,
it might be enough for the person who has them to answer affirmatively to the
question about the truth of those doxastic contents.
These considerations, the inclusion of which is intended to establish a con-
trast with our previous destructive work, suggest what might be the essential
lines of a concept of transparency purged of evidentialist servitudes. Emanci-
pating the transparency from evidentialism is the same as denying a basic as-
sumption on which some of the most widespread approaches to the subject’s
relationship with his own doxastic behavior are based — hat there is an epis-
temic rule of lawwhich the concept of belief imposes on deliberative contexts—
and implies opting for a weak interpretation of the principle that beliefs aim
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at truth. Steglich-Petersen adopts a similar starting point, but his transparency
without doxastic deliberation suffers from explanatory deficiencies with regard
to religious beliefs which are also found in the evidentialist version. Developing
a concept of transparency free of the failures due to an evidentialist affiliation is
a task that we hope to tackle at another time.
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